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INTRODUCTION
Antarctica and outer space have a lot in common. Like Antarctica, outer 
space is dangerous for humans; like Antarctica, outer space has a high strategic 
value; like Antarctica, outer space is quite interesting for research purposes. This 
means a lot for lawyers because the nature of a space has a great impact on its 
legal status.
Nevertheless, for historical reasons Antarctica and outer space are rather 
different as far as their legal statuses are concerned. In fact, despite the existing 
claims by some states on Antarctica, on the one hand, and the acceptance of the 
nonappropriation principle of outer space, on the other, the common natural, 
strategic, and scientific aspects of both spaces make a comparison of their legal 
framework and governance very efficient.
In 1959 activities in Antarctica were already important, and the Antarctic 
Treaty succeeded in breaking the vicious circle that impeded scientific activities 
on this disputed territory.1 The freezing of the claims and refusal of new claims 
made possible efficient scientific activities on the cold continent. Outer space 
activities were at their very beginning, and the cold war and a significant balance 
between both superpowers made possible the recognition of a legal status that in 
many ways was copied from the Antarctic Treaty.
Both Antarctic and outer space activities were boosted by the International 
Geophysical Year, 1957–1958. Sputnik, the first artificial satellite of the Earth, 
was launched on 4 October 1957; Explorer 1 launched on 1 February 1958, 
opening the way to the discovery of the Van Allen belt.
Fifty years later, it is interesting to go on comparing both regimes. Doing 
so, we must keep in mind that outer space is much more sensitive for strategy 
and defence than Antarctica; the vision of a dominance of the Earth through 
space dominance is commonplace in geostrategic theories. Economically, outer 
space is also quite important, for instance, in telecommunications and remote 
sensing. Still, on many issues, this comparison may be quite useful. For a law-
yer and a specialist in space law the hypothesis for this paper is that we have 
a rather evolved legal framework for outer space, but we have too few coop-
eration mechanisms. For the time being, the treaties governing outer space are 
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rather good for setting important principles regulating 
outer space activities, but cooperation between interested 
states is too limited to manage this common space and to 
improve the current legal framework without destroying 
it. Many problems are now before us that need concrete 
international cooperation to be solved. It seems that the 
cooperation in Antarctica may be a good example of what 
should be done in outer space.
This paper will present the current legal status of 
outer space, keeping in mind a comparison with the legal 
status of Antarctica, and will consider the necessity of a 
common international governance, taking advantage of 
the experience of Antarctica, which is more advanced but 
quite comparable in many ways.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK:  
PRINCIPLES OF OUTER SPACE LAW
Outer space is ruled by treaties setting precise and ac-
cepted legal principles. Because of the cold war, the two 
superpowers supported and accepted treaties organising 
outer space activities. Both wanted a rather precise legal 
framework in order to block the other’s activities. A good 
example of this is Article II of the 1967 Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space (also called the Outer Space 
Treaty [OST]), which establishes the nonappropriation 
principle.2 Given the balance between them, especially in 
the race to the Moon, both were interested in preventing 
the other one from claiming any possession in outer space 
and especially on the Moon. Both states also accepted the 
provision to limit military activities in outer space and 
on the Moon and other celestial bodies. Both accepted 
their responsibility and liability for space activities. These 
rather progressive provisions were proposed by the two 
powers and accepted by other states years before practical 
activities made it a necessity.
The main rules regulating outer space activities will 
now be considered. Like in Antarctica, but certainly more 
clearly and precisely, states play a very central role in outer 
space activities.
CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE
States are responsible for “national activities in Outer 
Space.” This important provision of Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty, the “Magna Charta of Outer Space,” was the 
interesting result of a compromise between the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States. In 
their proposal for a “Draft Declaration of the Basic Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space” to the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1962, the 
USSR wanted to block any private activity in outer space.3 
Despite the fact that no private activity was conducted 
there at the time, the United States refused this limitation. 
A compromise was finally found that accepts private ac-
tivities under the strict control of a state. Point 5 of the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and Ar-
ticle VI of the Outer Space Treaty consider states to be re-
sponsible for “national activities in Outer Spaces.”4 Those 
texts specify that these activities include “nongovernmen-
tal” ones: “whether such activities are carried on by gov-
ernmental agencies or by non- governmental entities.”
Thanks to this compromise, private activities are al-
lowed, but are clearly under the control of a state, which 
is responsible for their adherence to international law, in-
cluding space law.5 Moreover, Article VI goes on to specify 
that “the activities of non- governmental entities in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
require authorization and continuing supervision by the 
appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” These rules make 
clear that any activity in outer space and on the Moon and 
other celestial bodies must be carried out “in accordance 
with international law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations.”6 For this reason many states involved in space 
activities are currently enacting domestic space legislation 
to control any space activity from their territory and also 
any activity of their nationals from international territory 
or even from the territory of a foreign state.
This principle goes further than the usual interna-
tional law obligations of a state because of its personal 
jurisdiction. It creates a responsibility for states on behalf 
of their private entities, which is the only such case in in-
ternational law and, therefore, is particularly important 
for spaces that are out of territorial jurisdiction of states. 
Like many other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, the 
1968 Rescue Agreement,7 the 1972 Liability Convention,8 
and the 1975 Registration Convention9 have been widely 
accepted and may be considered as customary law and 
therefore are applicable to every state whether it is a party 
to the Outer Space Treaty or not.
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED  
BY A SPACE OBJECT
The other main provision of space law is the liabil-
ity set by Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the 
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Liability Convention. It seems that this very “victim- 
oriented” rule was the counterpart favoured by nonspace-
faring countries for accepting the freedom of use of outer 
space by other countries. Given the sovereignty of states 
over their territory recognised in the Paris Convention of 
1919 and that this freedom was not obvious at the time, 
the guarantee given by the United States and USSR that 
damage on Earth would be indemnified was a good way 
to limit the concerns of states not taking part but at risk to 
be damaged by the fall of space objects.
This liability is rather broad as relating to damage 
caused on Earth or to an aircraft in flight. It is much less 
efficient for damage caused in orbit when another space-
faring state is involved.
The liability for damage on Earth is very protective. It 
lies with the launching state, defined as a state launching, 
a state procuring the launch, or a state whose facilities or 
territory are used for the launch. If there is more than one 
launching state, which is currently very often the case, 
they are jointly and severally liable; that means that the 
victim may sue any of them for the whole indemnifica-
tion. There are no possible exceptions; neither an act of 
God nor the fault of a third person may be used by the li-
able launching state, not even the fault of the victim if not 
gross negligence or willful misconduct. Contrary to the 
liability of ship owners according to the Brussels Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage,10 the liability of the launching state is unlimited 
in amount or in time. Moreover, the victim is not pre-
vented from seeking compensation through other ways, 
for instance, before a domestic judge under a domestic 
law.11 As such, the 1972 Liability Convention mechanism 
may be seen as a safety net provided by the launching 
state to potential victims. It also has the advantage of 
motivating states to exercise a strict and efficient control 
over the activities that might cause them to be considered 
as a liable launching state.
The responsibility of states for national activities in 
outer space, including the obligation to authorise and 
supervise private ones, and the liability of the launching 
states are a strong incentive for states to exert efficient 
control over every outer space activities.
There are nevertheless some important shortcomings 
of the 1972 Liability Convention. The most important is 
related to damage. As usual in law, damage to the environ-
ment as such is not taken into consideration. This general 
problem does not come from the nature of the damage 
but from the fact that we need a victim to ask for and to 
get compensation. If the environmental damage is caused 
on the territory of a state, like in 1978 with the fall of the 
Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 on the territory of Canada, the 
state can ask for compensation.12 If the damage is caused 
to an international space like the high seas or outer space 
and at least some parts of Antarctica, that would not be 
the case; basically, no state would be entitled to ask for 
compensation for this damage.
There are currently some proposals in the legal sub-
committee of the COPUOS to envisage the negotiation of 
a general convention on space activities following the ex-
ample of the Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Russia and China propose to enter into discussion in 
a “holistic approach.” Despite the interest to enter into 
discussions, such a project appears extremely dangerous 
to currently accepted rules, especially on responsibility 
and liability. For the time being it is very doubtful that 
any state would accept such a heavy burden. It is true 
that the situations are rather different; the risk of dam-
age is much higher in Antarctica than damage from a 
space object falling on the Earth, but we can see from 
the negotiations on Annex VI to the Protocol on Envi-
ronmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty regarding 
liability that it would be quite difficult to make states 
accept now, in a different context, the rules of the 1972 
Liability Convention.
APPROPRIATION AND NONAPPROPRIATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES
Regarding appropriation and sovereignty, the legal 
situation of outer space is much clearer than Antarc-
tica’s.13 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty clearly sets 
a nonappropriation principle.14 Despite some interpreta-
tions which are often close to bad faith, the rule is wide, 
clear, and indisputable: “Outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national ap-
propriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.” It applies not only to 
the bodies but also to the orbits, the “void space,” as Bin 
Cheng named it.15
Despite this clear wording, some try to dispute this 
principle. In our time of general private appropriation, 
they cannot accept a common domain for humanity. Some 
argue that the limitation is for “national appropriation” 
and thus does not apply to private persons. It is a misun-
derstanding of the word “national,” which is not synonym 
with “state”. If we consider the context, i.e., Article VI 
of the same treaty, “national activities” expressly include 
governmental and nongovernmental entities.16 In Ameri-
can English the word “nation” is often used instead of 
“state,” but, in fact, the “nation” is both the government 
and the people having the nationality of a state.17
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Even if some claims are far from serious, they appear 
so interesting to the world’s media that they are widely 
spread and enable some to make a lot of money to the 
detriment of not only consenting victims but also, and 
more seriously, of the principle itself. The well- known 
claims made by the “Head Cheese,” Dennis Hope, for 
the Moon and every planet of the solar system are a good 
example of this distortion of the law and of the evolution 
of a fanciful project turning into a money making en-
terprise.18 Another claim is more interesting from a legal 
perspective. A U.S. citizen, Gregory W. Nemitz, knowing 
about a project by NASA to land a space probe on the 
asteroid Eros, decided to claim it as his property. When 
NASA landed its spacecraft on the asteroid, he asked for 
a rent before federal courts of justice.19 The decisions of 
the courts dismissed this claim but are not quite decisive 
on the nonappropriation principle itself. On the other 
hand, the U.S. Department of State had the opportunity 
to fully clarify the point of claims on asteroids. Respond-
ing to Mr. Nemitz’s letters, Ralph L. Braibanti, Director 
of the Space and Advanced Technology, U.S. Department 
of State, clearly stated, “Dear Mr. Nemitz. We have re-
viewed the ‘notice’ dated February 13, 2003, that you 
sent to the U.S. Department of State. In the view of the 
Department, private ownership of an asteroid is pre-
cluded by article II of the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies. Accordingly, we have concluded that your claim 
is without legal basis.”20
The problem is more serious and practical when or-
bits are concerned, especially the geostationary orbit. 
As is well known, the satellites that are placed on a cir-
cular and equatorial orbit at an altitude of 35,786 km 
(22,236 miles) are turning quite fast but remain in view 
of the same position of the Earth.21 By nature, such or-
bital positions are limited, and so are the radio frequen-
cies needed for communication from and to the Earth. 
The International Telecommunication Union is in charge 
of administering these limited resources for states, with 
their cooperation. The application of the “first come, 
first served” principle was criticized by less- developed 
countries who disliked the attribution of some orbital 
positions and radio frequencies on an a priori basis. The 
evolution of a scientific technique eased the way for a so-
lution. The colocalisation of many satellites on the same 
position and the digitalisation of the emissions enabled 
the useful capacity of orbits and number of frequencies 
to be greatly increased. The issue is still present, and need 
an efficient international cooperation, but having the 
issue considered in a technical way where practical solu-
tions are needed is helpful.
PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE
The provisions on military uses of outer space are glob-
ally much less ambitious than the one accepted in the Ant-
arctic Treaty. Military activities were envisaged from the 
beginning of space activities by both the United States and 
the USSR. We have to remember that at that time, both 
states were conducting large spying activities, with the USSR 
mostly on the ground and the United States overflying the 
Soviet territory with the U2.22 The launch of the first satel-
lite by the USSR was perhaps an opportunity for the United 
States and western countries because it opened the way for 
freedom of use and, consequently, satellite intelligence. The 
USSR tried to outlaw the use of satellites for intelligence 
purposes,23 but this prohibition was not considered further. 
The laws of physics and the practical impossibility of pre-
venting this use necessarily overrule the legal rules.
According to the OST, outer space is divided into 
two different parts as far as military activities are con-
cerned: the orbits around the Earth, on the one hand, and 
the Moon and other celestial bodies and their orbits, on 
the other. International customary law, the OST, and, in 
fact, general international law prescribe peaceful use of 
outer space. Article IV of the OST also prohibits placing 
“in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear 
 weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.” The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water also ap-
plies.24 Any other military activities are not prohibited 
on the orbit around the Earth. The meaning of peaceful 
use may be disputed; given the common practice of states, 
it is difficult to see there a ban of any military activity 
and anything more than the obligation not to be aggres-
sive. Currently, satellites, whether civilian or military, are 
used by the military for remote sensing/intelligence, com-
munication, and positioning. Many of these activities are 
dual use. It may also be considered that remote sensing/ 
intelligence satellites may help tracking every activity and 
are therefore a necessity to preserve peace.
A much less acceptable evolution is what is called 
“weaponisation,” which is the act of putting weapons in 
outer space whether they are directed to targets in space or 
on the Earth. This sensitive point will be examined later in 
the light of the Antarctica Treaty System.
On the Moon and other celestial bodies, the legal situ-
ation is very close to the Antarctic one. The wording of 
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Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty duplicates nearly ex-
actly Article I of the Antarctic Treaty.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all 
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The 
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, 
the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military 
manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.
There are two differences that seem to weaken the 
OST compared to the Atlantic Treaty: The words “for 
peaceful purposes only” are changed into an appar-
ently stronger “exclusively for peaceful purposes.” This 
wording may have been used in order to make a clearer 
distinction between the “peaceful use” that is required 
everywhere in outer space and “exclusively peaceful use” 
only compulsory for celestial bodies. The second differ-
ence is quite significant of the more- limited outline of the 
OST; it is the removal of the words “inter alia,” which are 
so important in legal texts. It transforms an open list into 
a limited one. In addition, a useful precision is added in 
the more modern text, including installations along with 
military bases and fortifications.
In both texts, the last precision, under a slightly dif-
ferent wording, is quite useful to enlighten the meaning 
of “peaceful purposes only” and “exclusively for peaceful 
purposes,” respectively. If there is a case where military 
personnel or equipment may be used when they are not 
conducting military activity, this wording clarifies that in 
Antarctica and on celestial bodies military activities as 
such are prohibited.
THE PROTECTION OF SPACE ENVIRONMENT
At the time of the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, 
environmental issues were not paramount. Article IX of 
the OST deals with “harmful contamination” of outer 
space and celestial bodies and “adverse changes of the 
environment of the Earth.” It was the follow up of the 
consideration by the Committee on Space Research (CO-
SPAR) when OST considered the possible contamination 
from outer space and established in 1958 the Committee 
on Contamination by Extra- terrestrial Exploration and in 
1959 the Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Ef-
fects of Space Experiments. The draft of Article IX of the 
Outer Space Treaty was very much influenced by the cold 
war. The USSR complained against the U.S. West Ford Ex-
periment, which consisted of placing millions of copper 
needles in outer space,25 and the United States criticized 
the USSR for nuclear testing in the high atmosphere. Ar-
ticle IX set some obligations to cooperate which, for the 
time being, remained mostly theoretical. They will be pre-
sented later in connection with the lessons that may be 
learned from the activities in Antarctica.
The framework set for outer space by the UN treaties 
and resolutions had been established during the cold war 
by a consensus between the two superpowers. For the time 
being, the normative process is at a standstill. We need 
to evolve to a more- efficient cooperation between inter-
ested states. The work of the COPUOS is currently nearly 
blocked. The practice of the Antarctic Treaty System may 
be a good example to give a new start to real cooperation 
driven by scientists and engineers if political, military, and 
strategic issues can be set aside, at least in part.
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION
There are many cooperations in outer space, both 
multilateral, for example, the activities of the Interna-
tional Space Station, and bilateral. Even during the cold 
war, some cooperations between the two superpowers 
took place. These cooperations are mostly performing 
some task together and are not targeted at jointly regulat-
ing outer space itself and the activities conducted there.
Over the last few years, it has appeared more and 
more obvious that some kind of international regulations 
are necessary. The increase in the number of spacefaring 
states, the danger coming from space debris, the necessity 
to rationalise space traffic on some overcrowded orbits, 
the trend to weaponize outer space, and the projects aimed 
at the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies increase the 
necessity to enter into cooperation, especially if the use of 
the resources of theses bodies is concerned.
The cooperation of states in Antarctica within the Ant-
arctic Treaty System seems to be quite a good example to 
follow. The two spaces have some important differences. 
The main one seems to be legal; paradoxically, in prac-
tice, it is not. The existence of claims in Antarctica and 
the undisputed nonappropriation of outer space seem to 
have few consequences. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty 
regarding “freezing of the claims” seems sufficient to push 
aside most difficulties.
The main difference comes, perhaps, from the uses 
of both spaces. A strategic and even military use of outer 
space is not abandoned; it is even very much increasing. 
Even if some commercial activities take place in Antarc-
tica like tourism, they are still much less important than 
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the scientific activities. This is not the case of outer space, 
where commercial activities are important. Some, like 
telecommunication, are already very profitable. Generally 
speaking, the role of scientists in outer space activities is 
much less than what they are in Antarctica.26
Still some characteristics of outer space are close to 
Antarctica’s. If states really want to commonly organise 
outer space as an international common, the example of 
the cooperation in Antarctica seems to be quite relevant. 
Given the strategic and economical importance of outer 
space, it will certainly be more difficult than in Antarctica. 
Three major issues will be discussed: spatial environment, 
reduction and control of military activities, and the man-
agement of resources of outer space and celestial bodies.
REGULATING ACTIVITIES AND  
PROTECTING SPACE ENVIRONMENT
For the time being, we have some rules for outer space 
that are rather general and imprecise, and in any case, 
they are applied by states without any international inter-
governmental control or even international cooperation. 
No specialized intergovernmental organisation exists for 
regulating outer space activities. The COPUOS is only a 
subsidiary of the UN General Assembly, with very little 
autonomy and small technical and administrative capac-
ity. Some organisations are dealing with space activities 
as a part of their attributions, like the International Tele-
communication Union, which is in charge of allocating 
radio frequencies and geostationary orbital positions. 
Other organisations, like UNESCO, intervene in outer 
space activities but have little real effects. In Geneva the 
UN Conference on Disarmament is competent for mili-
tary activities in outer space, but despite some proposals, 
discussions on these issues are currently at a standstill 
because some major states do not want any discussions 
on these issues. As far as nongovernmental organisations 
are concerned, COSPAR has an important role in some 
precise and limited fields of space activities, especially 
those that do not yet have major strategic or economical 
impact, such as the study of potentially environmentally 
detrimental activities or planetary protection.27 The Inter-
agency Debris Coordination Committee has been created 
by space agencies to cooperate on space debris mitigation. 
In any case, this cooperation is limited by the reluctance of 
some states to enter into discussions that may lead to any 
legal constraint.
Article IX of the OST sets a general obligation to “con-
duct all their activities in outer space . . . with due regard 
to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to 
the Treaty.” It deals with possible harmful contamination 
of celestial bodies and “adverse changes in the environ-
ment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter.” Cooperation between states is required 
“if a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an 
activity or experiment . . . would cause potentially harm-
ful interference with activities of other States Parties in the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”
It would be of major interest to have some organised 
discussions after the establishment of a mechanism of 
environmental impact assessment. In this matter, the so-
phisticated mechanism applicable to Antarctica could be 
transformed for space activities.
In the field of planetary protection, even if it is a rela-
tively limited activity compared with other more strategic 
and commercial spatial endeavours, we have a good ex-
ample of what could be done. It is the most comparable 
issue with cooperation and scientific influence within the 
Antarctic system. The COSPAR’s Panel on Potentially En-
vironmentally Detrimental Activities in Space (PEDAS) 
and Panel on Planetary Protection (PPP) are active in this 
limited but important field.28
The graduation of requirements according to possible 
impact would be major progress. Even if, at the end of 
the process, states would have the last word, the necessity 
to discuss their projects would be quite interesting. Some 
controversial projects were already proposed for outer 
space. Fortunately, they were partially stopped. Let me 
refer, for example, to the Project West Ford to put a ring 
of copper needles around Earth’s orbit in order to com-
municate using the needles as a reflector. This project con-
tributed to space debris and was criticized by scientists.29 
The system was abandoned when satellite communication 
became efficient.30 Another project was also set and aban-
doned: Russian scientists launched Znamya, a mirror re-
flecting the Sun and able to illuminate places during the 
night, with illumination about two times the glow of a full 
moon. This mirror would conserve electricity but would 
create significant light pollution. Exploration and use of 
the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies open the way 
to discussions on the impact of these activities on the ce-
lestial bodies, such as contamination by terrestrial organ-
isms (forward contamination), and also the impact on the 
Earth as a result of materials returned from outer space 
carrying potential extraterrestrial organisms (backward 
contamination). A comparison may be made between this 
issue and the activities of the Scientific Committee on Ant-
arctic Research and, for instance, its Subglacial Antarctic 
Lake Exploration Group of Specialists.31
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Many other programs have been or may be envisaged; 
publicly available environmental impact assessments are 
necessary before they are launched, especially, but not 
only, when nuclear power sources are involved or for ac-
tivities on celestial bodies that appear to have more than 
a “minor or transitory impact on the environment.” The 
rules of Annex I of the Protocol on Environmental Protec-
tion to the Antarctic Treaty and the way they are imple-
mented would be very a good example to follow. Most of 
them can be directly transposed and used for outer space 
activities.32 The rules will work if the strategic or economi-
cal pressures are not too strong. If they are, a stronger and 
compulsory legal framework should be decided and gener-
ally accepted, a difficult work in perspective.
On a more regularly basis the protection of outer 
space against space debris is much needed. Some orbits are 
already dangerous. The recent creation of much debris33 in 
very useful orbits shows the necessity to organise a kind of 
“space traffic management.”34
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE
As discussed, military activities are not prohibited in 
orbits around the Earth as far as they are nonaggressive 
and do not use weapons of mass destruction. It is now 
a necessity to avoid an arm race in outer space. The so- 
called weaponisation would be extremely costly. It must 
be emphasised that weapons would also be mostly useless 
for security purposes. Satellites are very fragile; it is quite 
easy to destroy them, either one by one with appropriate 
rockets or laser beams or all at once with nuclear bombs. 
Satellites for military activities are useful for low- or 
middle- level conflicts.35 In case of a high- level conflict in-
volving spacefaring countries, the destruction of satellites 
could be very quickly done as a “Spatial Pearl Harbor.”36 
Such destruction with the related creation of a lot of debris 
would prevent any activity, whether military or civilian, 
for years or even centuries. The solution is not to increase 
the space dominance of one state or another or to try with-
out success to harden satellites but to limit militarisation 
and to forbid weaponisation of outer space.
If agreements may be negotiated and accepted, it 
would be necessary to set an efficient international con-
trol, the condition of this acceptation by any state. The ex-
ample of the current practice in Antarctica would, mutatis 
mutandis, be quite interesting. Of course, the practical sit-
uation is rather different as theses activities are conducted 
in outer space, where it is not technically possible to make 
any inspection. On the other hand, no space activity can 
be really secretly conducted, launching a spacecraft is so 
“noisy” that every state with some technical capabili-
ties is immediately aware of each of them.37 A control on 
Earth is needed and should be accepted. The argument 
that the possible use of many apparently civilian satellites 
for military or even aggressive purposes prevents any effi-
cient control is not acceptable. It would be like refusing to 
control the commerce on heavy weapons because crimes 
might be committed with kitchen knives.38 Of course, it is 
obvious that it would be a more difficult task to have this 
limitation accepted for outer space than for Antarctica, 
where military activities seems much less “useful.”
The situation is, of course, different for military ac-
tivities on the Moon or other celestial bodies. The cur-
rent legal situation is very comparable to Antarctica’s: no 
military activity is permitted. Inspection of installations is 
feasible as far as the states have the technical capability 
to do so. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty opens the 
possibility of such a visit:39
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on 
the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representa-
tives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciproc-
ity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of 
a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may 
be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure 
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the 
facility to be visited.
EXPLOITING THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF 
THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES
Given the technical and financial difficulties of ex-
ploiting the Moon or any other celestial bodies, this activ-
ity seems to be rather futuristic. Here also it may be quite 
interesting to compare with the situation of Antarctica. 
For a nonscientist, It is difficult to have a precise opinion 
of whether a ban of any mining activity should be sup-
ported for the Moon as it was for Antarctica; it may be.
If not, it may be quite useful to have a look at the for-
mer Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities (CRAMRA). First of all, this text was 
proposed before any mining activity took place in Antarc-
tica; the supportive states expressed their will to discuss 
this issue before it would be necessary to act in a hurry. 
We are perhaps in the same situation for celestial bodies.
The mechanism created by CRAMRA succeeded at an 
apparently impossible task: to organise a mining activity 
on a territory where states do not agree on sovereignty. It 
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would be much easier task for the Moon and celestial bod-
ies, where the principle of nonappropriation is accepted by 
treaties and even by international customary law.
For the time being, we do have a treaty: the Moon 
Agreement.40 It was mostly proposed by the U.S. del-
egation to COPUOS and accepted by consensus in the 
COPUOS and by the UN General Assembly.41 Later, be-
cause of political changes in the United States, strong lob-
bying of some space activists, and the necessity to obtain 
the authorisation of the U.S. Senate for ratification, the 
project was set aside, and many states are no longer con-
sidering its ratification. The agreement was only accepted 
by 13 states.42 None of them has or even considers having 
the capability to go to the Moon. Nevertheless, as shown 
by its acceptation by consensus in the COPUOS and UN 
General Assembly, this agreement is quite acceptable if 
ideology can be set aside. In Article 11, it declares “the 
moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
of mankind.” States have the right to explore and use 
the moon without discrimination. Exploitation would 
need an agreement establishing an international regime 
“to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the moon.” Such a regime should be negotiated “when 
such exploitation is about to become feasible.” Article 
11, paragraph 7, indicates the main purpose of such a 
regime.
Despite its limited ambitions, for reasons that are 
more ideological than practical, this agreement is cur-
rently demonised. If we want to have a legal regime for 
exploiting the resources of the Moon, it may be necessary 
to draft a new instrument. Both the Montego Bay Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (as modified by the New 
York Agreement) and CRAMRA may be used by analogy 
to build the future regime.
As is currently the case for the resources of the bottom 
of the sea, if there is some possibility to mine the Moon, 
it will be necessary to adopt a clear international agree-
ment. The concept of the common heritage of mankind 
is the logical consequence of the nonappropriation and 
res communis, the common province of mankind prin-
ciples when consumable goods (i.e., goods destroyed by 
first use) are to be exploited. This is already the case for 
sea resources. The refusal of this principle has more to do 
with ideology than pragmatism. The Moon Agreement, as 
accepted by every delegation to the COPUOS, envisages 
“an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits 
derived from those resources, whereby the interests and 
needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of 
those countries which have contributed either directly or 
indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given 
special consideration.” In any case, it will be a long time 
before such exploitation becomes financially profitable. 
Like for Antarctica, it may be useful to enter into discus-
sion before the activity begins. The existence of a clear 
and undisputed legal regime is always a necessity before 
considering important investments. Here they promise to 
be huge. The CRAMRA was very much oriented toward 
a protection of the environment; on that issue, it may be 
quite useful for comparison.
CONCLUSIONS
The current status of Antarctica is generally well ac-
cepted; efficient cooperation is occurring. In outer space it 
should be quite useful to try, mutatis mutandis, to use the 
lessons from the Antarctic Treaty System. First, world sci-
entists should be given a more important role when issues 
are not too strategic; groups of experts within the frame-
work of the United Nations could be created in related sci-
entific areas, including space law. They should range from 
particular domains, like planetary protection, to more 
general uses, including mitigation of space debris, space 
traffic management, and even limitation of military uses.
In a longer perspective, the creation of an international 
organisation may be envisaged, but it is not a priority for 
the time being. A real international intergovernmental co-
operation should be largely improved, especially among 
states interested in space activities. The specificities of 
every state may be taken into consideration.43
Finally, the issue of demilitarisation with the necessary 
control should be seriously considered. Nonmilitarisation 
of outer space, like accepted for Antarctica, is certainly 
not possible in the foreseeable future for the orbit around 
the Earth, but international agreements to block weaponi-
sation are necessary and feasible. The example of Antarc-
tica is quite interesting in that regard.
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